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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. 
The Authorization leaves unanswered the question of whethor 
Butcher waived his right to advance notice of disbursements from 
his construction loan account. Parol evidence is necessary to 
ascertain the parties' intent and whether the four questioned 
disbursements violated that intent. 
II. 
Butcher does not seek to interpret the Author3zatjon 
selectively nor to contradict its limited forms. 
III. 
This suit was timely as to each of the lour wrongtuJ 
disbursements because the limitation period did not begin to run 
until after Butcher both discovered the disbursements and made 
demand for reimbursement under Utah's Commercial Code statute 
(U.C*A. §70A-4-406). Butcher's timely demand commenced the 
running of the statute of limitations. 
1. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE AUTHORIZATION LEAVES UNANSWERED THE QUESTION 
OB1 WHETHER BUTCHER WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO ADVANCE NOTICE 
OF DISBURSEMENTS FROM HIS CONSTRUCTION LOAN ACCOUNT. 
PAROL EVIDENCE IS NECESSARY TO ASCERTAIN THE 
PARTIES' INTENT AND WHETHER THE FOUR DISBURSEMENTS 
IN QUESTION VIOLATED THAT INTENT. 
The terse Authorization which the District Court found 
precluded Butcher from contesting any disbursements from his 
construction loan account was drafted by Crossland. Its 
conciseness does not recommend it as a model of lucidity. 
The Authorization by its exact terms does nothing more than 
remove the requirement that disbursement checks include Butcher's 
name as a co-payee. A grant of permission to make payoff checks 
"direct to the parties concerned" does not necessarily include 
the grant of permission to disburse funds without prior notice to 
the owner of the account (the borrower of the funds). If 
Crossland wanted blanket authority to deplete the construction 
loan account without any advance notice to its borrower and 
without the borrower having any right to object to disbursements, 
it should have drafted an Authorization explicitly giving it thai 
authority. The Authorization it did draft falls far short of 
giving Crossland such blanket authority. 
The Authorization does not reasonably put Bulchcr on notice 
that his signing it would rob him of all control over 
disbursement of the loan proceeds while preserving all. his 
liability on the loan. Nothing in the tersely opaque 
Authorization reflects a waiver of Butcher's right to know of 
and approve releases of funds from the account. 
If Crossland intended the Authorization to destroy Butcher's 
right to receive advance notice of disbursements or to object to 
disbursement requests he believed to be fraudulent or 
unwarranted, its intent is not reflected within the four corners 
of the document it prepared. Parol evidence is necessary to 
ascertain Crossland's intent. The ascertainment of Butcher's 
intent is even more critical, since he is the party who was 
injured by the questioned disbursements. Since the Authorization 
addresses only whether Butcher would need to be named as a 
co-payee on disbursement checks, evidence must be taken to determine 
whether Butcher intended that in signing the 
Authorization he was surrendering his right to know of and 
approve the amount and frequency of disbursements for labor and 
materials supposedly being supplied to the project. 
Butcher is entitled to his day in court. 
IT. 
BUTCHER DOES NOT SEEK TO INTERPRET THE AUTHOR J 7, AT ION 
"SELECTIVELY" NOR TO CONTRADICT ITS LIMITED TERMS. 
Crossland claims that because Butcher does not object to aJ1 
of the disbursements which were made, he is seeking to interpret 
the Authorization selectively- This is simply not true. Butcher 
objects to each disbursement which he did not approve.. Crossland 
asserts in paragraph 3 of its Statement of Facts that "all the 
disbursements made by Defendant were approved by either Butcher 
or his designated agent and contractor, Jerry WiJmore". This 
assertion, while true, is misleading. Butcher did not approve 
the disbursements at issue, and the agreement he signed did not 
authorize approval by Wilmore or any other third party. Butcher 
endorsed each payment authorization except the four he contosts 
in this suit. (See R. 79-94). Only those four disbursements 
were made without advance notice to Butcher. 
Contrary to Crossland1s contention, Butcher is not 
undertaking to contradict or vary the Language of the 
Authorization. Butcher merely points out that the Authorization 
does not, on its face, immunize Crossland from liability for 
making the four questioned disbursements. Parol evidence is 
necessary to determine whether the parties intended the 
Authorization to so immunize the Bank. The Authorization is 
facially ambiguous in that it does not state (or even imply) 
that the Borrower waives advance notice and approval of 
disbursements. 
1 1 1 . 
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WERE NOT BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
AND SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED SUMMAR I 1,Y . 
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due and payable) rather than the except ion applicable hero. nur 
Supreme <"e , w o v^r r i noV the occasion to set forth the entire 
b l,»ek lei i • 
The statute of J :i m11a t i ons begins t •) i u p -n a 
debt when it is due and payabLe unless "a 
contract existing between the parties provides 
that an additions] thing be done before action 
may be brought...." (citation omitted. , 
when it is contemplated that an amount w111 not 
be paid immediately, such as whero a b a n k holds 
a deposit subject to check or payment of 
interest, the statute of limitations does _no_t 
run until payment is demanded and refused. 
Esponda v. Ogden State Bank ,"75 Utah 1I Tf ' 1.2A , 
283 P. 729, 731 (1929)." (Emphasis added.) 
668 P.2d at 506. 
See a 1 so, Commercial Bank of Spanish Fork v. Spanish Fork__South 
Irr. Co. , 153 P.2d 547 (Utal i 1944). 
Both the Baker and the Commercial Bank of Spanish Fork cases 
cite with approval Esponda v. Ogden State Bank, 75 Utah 117, 
283 P.2d 729 (1929), for the holding that the limitations period < dim 
commence until the act complained of was discovered or, by 
reasonable diligence, could have been discovered. 
Like this case, Esponda concerned a claim against a bankinq 
institution. In Esponda the owner of a certificate of dopesiL 
made claim against the bank some fifteen years after Lhe bank 
disbursed the certificate proceeds to another person. Our 
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's finding that the claim 
was not untimely. After noting that the statute of limitations 
does not begin to run until a bank's wrongful act is discovered 
by the injured party, our Court held: 
The defendant's plea of the statute of limitations 
must also fail. The plaintiff had no cause of action 
against the defendant until he demanded payment of the 
certificate, and hence the statute of limitations did 
not begin to run until that date. 
Esponda v. Ogden State Bank, 75 Utah 117, 283 P. 729, 
731 (1929). 
The law set forth in Esponda applies to this case. ]f a 
fifteen year old claim against a bank for wrongful disbursement 
was not barred by the statute of limitations there, Butcher's 
claim against Crossland should not be barred here. 
Crossland erroneously claims that §70A-4-406 has no 
application to this suit. That statute defines the scope 
of a depositor's remedy and covers all claims by a depositor 
against a banking institution, regardless of the theoty upon 
whi'-n s-.* .. n cue!, . ,, ; K M r<quin.> (hat a depositor 
discover and report any unauthorized signature or endorsement or 
anv alteration on an Jl-r * - - nq 
o m e r i;;:::y^, breach of contract- Tally v. American Security-
Bank , 3 5 IJCC Rep . Serv, 215 (D.C. C i i J 9 8 2 ) ; Brig h ton , Inc^ < 
Colonial First National Bank, 4 22 A.2 d 433 (I I. 
19R0), aff fd 4^0 A ?d Q09 (1QPU 
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Section /'0A-4 406 applies even when t ^ o Hank rolainn the 
" items" on file. ,;< * ~->+i — American Security Har ml :, 
supra. 
The disbursement *q funds ! rem a depositor 'o an-fnin' ^--
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depos i for " s know l edge i ^  pr eo i se 1 y the si tuation meant to be 
addressed by §7UA- 4 400. Ine statute therefore applies. 
CONCLUSION 
It is hornbook law that a contract which is ambiguous or 
incomplete will be construed against the party which prepared it. 
See, e.g., 17 Am.Jur. Contracts §276 at 689-91. Here, 
Crossland prepared the Authorization behind which it soeks 
immunity from liability for the four disbursements it made without 
Butcher's knowledge or approval. 
The tersely opaque terms of the Authorization do nothing more 
than remove the requirement that disbursement checks include 
Butcher's name as a co-payee. If Crossland intended tho 
Authorization to destroy Butcher's right to receive advance 
notice of disbursements or to object to pay requests he believed 
to be unwarranted, its intent is not reflected within tho four 
corners of the document. Since the document does not reflect a 
clear waiver of Butcher's right to know of and approve reloases 
of funds from the account, parol evidence is necessary to 
ascertain the parties1 intent. 
Butcher does not seek to contradict the limited, terse terms 
of the Authorization. He merely contends that the Authorization 
does not, on its face, allow the disbursement of funds on the 
approval of persons other than himself. The four disbursements 
he contests were issued on the signature of other persons and 
without his knowledge. They were the only disbursements made 
without Butcher's signature on the "Contractors Authorization for 
Payment". (R. 79-94). 
Butcher does not ask that the Authorization be interpreted 
selectively, merely that it be interpreted consistently with his 
understanding that he had retained the right to know of and 
object to disbursements. 
The limitation period did not begin to run until after 
Butcher both discovered the unauthorized disbursements and made 
demand for reimbursement. Butcher's timely demand commenced tho 
running of the statute. His suit is timely as to each of the f<.< 
wrongful disbursements. 
The case should be remanded for a trial on all the claims 
asserted in the Complaint, including the two which the District 
Court incorrectly ruled were barred by the statute of 
limitations. 
Respectfully submitted this P\&/~r\ day of March, J990. 
DOUGLAS G. MpRTENSEN 
KRIS C. LEONARD 
MATHESON, MORTENSEN & OLSEN 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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